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Abstract
We characterize, in the framework for variational preferences, the a¤ec-
tive decision making model of choice under risk and uncertainty introduced by
Bracha and Brown(2007). This characterization (i) provides a rigorus decision-
theoretic foundation for a¤ective decision making, (ii) o¤ers an axiomatic expla-
nation for ambiguity-seeking in the Ellsberg Paradox and (iii) suggests a dual
representation of ADM games in terms of the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate.
JEL classication numbers: D01, D81, G22
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1 Introduction
As is well known, the subjective expected utility (SEU) models of Savage (1954) and
Anscombe and Aumann(1963) are refuted by the Ellsberg paradox (1961). In the
Ellsberg experiment, individuals are asked to bet on a draw from an urn with 100
balls, some red and the rest black, where the distribution is unknown or bet on a
draw from an urn with 50 black balls and 50 red balls. This experiment partitions
the subjects into three disjoint groups: A, B, and C. Individuals in Group A preferred
to bet on a black draw from the urn with the known distribution, rather than bet
on a black draw from the urn with the unknown distribution and similarly for bets
on drawing a red ball. Individuals in Group B, were indi¤erent between betting on
draws from either urn. Individuals in Group C preferred to bet on the ambiguous
urn.
In his thought experiment, Ellsberg (1961) on pg 651 suggests that the majority
of people are in group A, but a small minority are in group C and he ignores the
people in group B. As he points out, both Group A and C violate Savages axioms for
the SEU model. Subjects in Group A are said to be ambiguity-averse and subjects
in Group C are said to be ambiguity-seeking.
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A number of alternative models of choice under risk and uncertainty have been
proposed as resolutions of the Ellsberg paradox, such as the maximin expected utility
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or more recently the multiplier preferences of
Hansen and Sargent(2000). Recently, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini[MMR]
(2006) proposed variational preferences as a general class of preferences that rational-
ize ambiguity-averse choices. MMR (2006) show that variational preferences subsume
both maximin preferences and multiplier preferences and are characterized by six ax-
ioms, where axiom 5, due to Schmeidler (1989), is the axiom for ambiguity aversion.
This axiom has the simple geometric interpretation that the preference relation over
acts is quasi-concave. Moreover, if axiom 5 is replaced by axiom 5where the prefer-
ence relation over acts is quasi-linear, then axioms :1   4, 5 and 6 characterize the
SEU model. Both of these results are proven in MMR (2006).
The remaining possibility is that the preference relation over acts is quasi-convex
a possibility anticipated by Ellsbergs thought experiment (1961), where the decision-
makers in Group C were ambiguity-seeking. If so, then what is the behavioral inter-
pretation of this axiom and do these preferences share with variational preferences a
penalized SEU representation?
These are the questions we address in this paper.
In the variational preferences models the decision maker is playing a sequential
game against a malevolent nature, where nature moves last. Hence the solution con-
cept is maximin. In the a¤ective decision making (ADM) model proposed by Bracha
and Brown (2007) the rational and the emotional process of the decision-maker are
engaged in a simultaneous move, potential game, where the solution concept is Nash
equilibrium. Both classes of models are penalized SEU models. In the variational
preferences models the penalty reects the decision makers uncertainty that her "sub-
jective" beliefs about the states of the world are the correct state probabilities. In the
ADM model, the penality reects the mental cost of her "optimistic" beliefs about
preferred outcomes.
We suggest that the outcomes of Ellsbergs thought experiment are not para-
doxical, but allow for three mutually exclusive formulations of Schmeidlers axiom.
That is, preferences over acts can be quasi-concave, quasi-linear or quasi-convex. If
in addition preferences satisfy axioms 1   4 and axiom 6 in MMR (2006), then the
corresponding classes of preferences over acts are: variational preferences, SEU pref-
erences and ADM preferences.We show that if axiom 5 : f s g =) f+(1 )g < f
, the axiom that the preference relation over acts is quasi-concave, is replaced with
axiom b5: f s g =) f + (1   )g 4 f ,the axiom that the preference relation over
acts is quasi-convex, then the preference relation has an ADM representation if and
only if it satises axiom b5 and axioms 1  4 and 6 for variational preferences.
In the next section, we use the proof in MMR (2006) of their representation
theorem for variational preferences, with axiom b5 in lieu of axiom 5, to prove the
representation theorem for ADM preferences.
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2 A Decision-Theoretic Foundation for ADM
We follow the SETUP in MMR(2006), where: S is the set of states of the world; 
is an algebra of subsets of S, the set of events; and X, the set of consequences, is a
convex subset of some vector space. F is the set of (simple) acts, i.e., nite-valued
-measureable functions f : S  ! X. B() is the set of all bounded  -measureable
functions. B() with the sup-norm is an AM -space with unit, the constant function
1. Bo() the set of  -measureable simple functions is norm dense in B().The norm
dual of B() is ba(), nitely additive signed measures of bounded variation on 
for further discussion see chapter 13 in Aliprantis and Border(1999). If u : X  ! R,
then u(f) 2 Bo() for every f 2 F:
Niveloids are functionals on function spaces that are monotone: '   =) I(') 
I()and vertically invariant: I('+ r) = I(')+ r for all ' and r 2 Rsee Dolecki and
Greco (1995) for additional discussion. Epstein, Marinacci and Seo [EMS] (2007) show
in lemma A:5 that niveloids are Lipschitz continuous on any convex cone of an AM-
space with unit and concave(convex) if and only if they are quasi-concave(convex).
The general representation for variational preferences is:




. c :   ! [0;1] is a convex functional on the
simplex , the family of positive, nitely additive measures of bounded variation in





where q :  ! [0;1] is a concave functional on the simplex ; then V (f) is the
Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of the concave function q(p)see Rockafellar (1970), pg
308; for nite state spaces. If the decision-maker maximizes V (f) over her choice




. Hence her optimal
decision is a maximin equilibrium of the game against nature.
The potential function, (f; p); for an ADM intrapersonal game is: (f; p) =R
u(f)dp   c(p), where c :  ! [0;1] is a convex functional on the simplex : If




, then W (f) is the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of
the convex function c(p)see Rockafellar(1970), pg 104 for nite state spaces and Z¼a-
linescu (2002), pg 75 for innite state spaces. If the decision-maker maximizes W (f)





maxf2K;p2(f; p). Hence argmaxf2K;p2(f; p) is a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the ADM intrapersonal game. That is, maximax rather than maximin. Here
are our axioms, again we follow MMR(2006):
A:1(Weak Order): If f; g; h 2 F; (a) either g % f or f % g, and (b) f % g and
g % h =) f % h.
A:2(Weak Certainty Independence): If f; g 2 F; x; y 2 X and  2 (0; 1),then
f + (1  )x % g + (1  )x =) f + (1  )y % g + (1  )y.
A:3(Continuity): If f; g; h 2 F , the setsf 2 [0; 1] : f + (1  )g % hg and
f 2 [0; 1] : h % f + (1  )ggare closed
A:4(Monoticity): If f; g 2 F and f(s) % g(s) for all s 2 S;the set of states, then
f % g .
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A:b5(Quasi-Convexity): If f; g 2 F and  2 (0; 1); then
f s g =) f + (1  )g - f
A:6(Nondegeneracy): f  g for some f; g 2 F
Theorem 1 Let % be a binary order on F .The following conditions are equivalent:
(1)The relation % satises axioms A:1  A:6
(2)There exists a nonconstant a¢ ne function u : X  ! R and a continuous,
convex function c :   ! [0;1] where for all f; g 2 F , f % g ()




for all h 2 F
Proof. Axioms 1   4 are used in MMR(2006) to derive a nonconstant a¢ ne utility
function; u; over the space of consequences, X: u is extended to the space of sim-
ple acts, F , using certainty equivalents. That is, U(f) = u(xf) for each f 2 F ,
where xf :is the certainty equivalent of f . This is lemma 28 in MMR(2006), where
I(f) = U(f) is a niveloid on  = f' : ' = u(f) for some f 2 Fg.  is a convex
subset of B(M) and by Schmeidlerss axiom 5, I is quasi-concave on . We also
assume axioms1-4, so lemma 28 in MRR (2006) holds for the niveloid J in the ADM
representation theorem. By axiom b5, J is quasi-convex on :
MMR(2006) show in lemma 25 that I is concave if and only if I is quasi- concave.
Hence J is convex if and only if J is quasi-convex, since J is convex(quasi-convex) if
and only if  J is concave(quasi-concave). MMR(2004) extend I to a concave niveloidbI on all of B()see lemma 25 in MMR (2004). Since B() is a convex cone in an
AM-space with unit, bI is Lipshitz continuous. It follows from the theorem of the bi-
conjugate for continuous, concave functionals that I(') = infp2ba()
nR
'dp  bI(p)o,
where bI(p) = inf'2Bo() nR 'dp  bI(')o is the concave, conjugate of bI(') see
Rockafellar (1970), pg 308:for nite state spaces. MMR(2006) show on pg. 1476
that we can restrict attention to , the family of positive, nitely additive mea-







, where ' = u(f) and
c(p) =  bI(p). c(p) is convex since bI (p) is concave.
Extending -J to - bJ on B(), using lemma 25 in MMR (2004), it follows from the
theorem of the biconjugate for continuous, convex functionals that
J(') = maxp2ba()
nR
'dp  bJ(p)o where bJ(p) = max'2Bo() nR 'dp  bJ(')o
is the convex, conjugate of bJ(') see Rockafellar (1970), pg 104 for nite state spaces
and Z¼alinescu (2002), pg 77 for innite state spaces.







= W (f), where ' = u(f) and c(p) = bJ(p). c(p) is convex
since bJ (p) is convex:
f % g () J(u(f))  J(u(g)) () W (f)  W (g):
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Remark 2 The u in our representation theorem is a¢ ne.To obtain a concave u as
assumed in Bracha and Brown (2007), it may su¢ ce to consider some combination
of axioms in Savage (1954) and axioms in MMR (2006), see Strzalecki (2007)and
replace A:5 by Ab5:
3 A Dual Representation of ADM Games
Bracha and Brown (2007) dene the potential function, (x; p) for an ADM game as
(x; p) = h !u (x); pi c(p).  !u (x) = (u(x1); u(x2); :::; u(xK)) is the state -utility vector
for a smooth, concave Bernoulli utility function u : R++ ! R++, c : (RK++) ! R
is the smooth, convex cost function of the emotional process and (RK) is the dual
space of RK : The proof of the axiomatic characterization of ADM preferences and
variational preferences presented in section 2 suggests a dual characterization of ADM
games in terms of  !u (x) and c(y), the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of c(p).
This dual representation has important, empirical implications for rationalizing
market data with ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity- averse preferences. Here is the
intutition for the dual representation. We restrict attention to nite state spaces for
ease of exposition.
Given the cost function c(p) dened on the simplex   (RK+ ), extend c to bc on
all of (RK) by dening bc(p) to be +1 for all p =2  and bc(p) = c(p) for all p 2 .
The Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of bc(p) denoted bc(y) is a convex function on RK
with values in the extended reals R. bc( !u (x)) can be interepted as the optimal value
function dened by the convex, upper envelope of the family of value functions of the
concave maximization problems of the rational process, parameterized by the best
responses of the emotional process: see the discussion of the envelope theorem in
Dixit (1990) and his gure 5:1.
Following section 26 in Rockafellar (1970), a smooth, monotone, stictly convex cost
function, c(p), on (RK++)
 is said to be of Legendre type if rc(p) is a di¤eomorphism
from (RK++)
 onto RK++. It follows from Hadamards theorem (1932) see Theorem
6.2.8 in Krantz and Parks (2002) that this condition is equivalent to the "essentially
smooth" condition given on pg.258 in Rockafellar. If c(p) is of Legendre type on
(RK++)
, then the Legendre conjugate of c(p), c(y) = hy; (rc) 1(y)i   c((rc) 1(y))
is of Legendre type on RK++. Moreover, rc = (rc) 1 and the Legendre conjugate of
c(y), c(p) = c(p). An ADM game with potential function (x; p) = h !u (x); pi c(p)
is said to be of Legendre type if c(p) is of Legendre type.
The market data D = f(qi; xi)gNi=1, where qi are the market prices and xi are the
choices of the decision maker.
Theorem 3 If (x; p) = h !u (x); pi   c(p) is the potential function for an ADM
game of Legendre type, then c(
 !
u(x)) = (x; p(x)) is the optimal value function for
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the concave maximization problems of the rational process, parameterized by the best
responses of the emotional process, where p(x) = (rc) 1( !u (x)) is the best response
of the emotional process, i.e., rc(
 !
u(x)) = p(x).
Proof. c( !u (x)) = supp2(RK++)fh
 !u (x); pi   c(p)g = supp2(x; p). The rst order
condition for this maximization problem is rc(p) =  !u (x). If p(x) = (rc) 1( !u (x));
then it follows from the envelope theorem that the optimal value function(x; p(x)) =
c( !u (x)) = h !u (x); p(x)i   c(p(x)) is the upper envelope of the family of value
functions for the concave maximization problems : supfx2RK++: qx=Igfh
 !u (x); p(x)i  
c(p(x))g, parameterized by p(x) where rc(
 !
u(x)) = p(x). c( !u (x)) is the sup of a
family of functions a¢ ne in  !u (x), hence convex in  !u (x).
Theorem 4 If D is rationalized by an ADM game of Legendre type with potential
function (x; p) = h !u (x); pi c(p), then there exists a function J(y) of Legendre type
on RK++, where J(
 !u (x)) = c( !u (x)) and rxJ(u(xk)) = kqk for k = 1; 2; ::; N .
Proof. Let J(y) = c(y) = supp2(RK++)fhy; pi c(p)g, where y 2 R
K
++. rxJ(u(xk)) =
rc( !u (xk))  r !u (xk) = p(xk)  r !u (xk), where z  w is the Hadamard product of
z 2 (RK)++and w 2 RK++:Hence rxJ(u(xk)) = kqk for k = 1; 2; ::; N is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for each k, since xk is the best response of the rational
process to p(xk), the best response of the emotional process.
Theorem 5 If there exists a function J(y) of Legendre type on RK++ and a smooth,
monotone, concave Bernoulli utility u : R++ ! R++, where rxJ( !u (xk)) = kqk
for k = 1; 2; ::; N , then D is rationalized by the ADM game of Legendre type with
potential function (x; p) = h !u (x); pi   J(p).
Proof. This is the converse of Theorem 4, and follows from the theorem of the
biconjugate, i.e., J(y) is the Legendre conjugate of J(p).
Theorem 6 If an ADM game is of Legendre type with potential function (x; p) =
h !u (x); pi   c(p), then (x,p) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the ADM game if
and only if c( !u (x)) + c(p) = h !u (x); pi and rxc( !u (x)) = q, where q denes the
decision makers budget set
Proof. c( !u (x)) + c(p) = h !u (x); pi if and only if rc(p) =  !u (x) and rc( !u (x)) =
p  see Proposition 11:3 in Rockafellar and Wets (1998). rc( !u (x)) = p is the
best response of the emotional process to  !u (x), the decision of the rational process.
rc(p) =  !u (x) is the best response of the rational process to p, the decision of the
emotional process, if rxc( !u (x)) = q.
A similar analysis holds for variational preferences and concave cost functions of
Legendre type.
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Remark 7 The notion of risk aversion is problematic in the case of ambiguity- seek-
ing decision makers, since J( !u (x)) need not be concave in x, if J is convex in
 !u (x).Consider the following examples of the composition of a convex function J
and a concave function u; where J : R++ ! R++ and u : R++ ! R++ :(i) If
J(y) = exp((1=2)y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x1=2 (risk-averse)
(ii)If J(y) = exp(y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x (risk-neutral)
(iii)If J(y) = exp(2y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x2 (risk-seeking).
Of course, if J is a monotone concave funtion as is the case with SEU and variational
preferences, then  !u (x) risk-averse in x implies J( !u (x)) is risk-averse in x.
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